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ABSTRACT
We introduce both the new inception of Law in Context - A Socio-legal Journal and the continuing issue of LiC 36 (1). 
The editorial provides a brief historical account of the Journal since its inception in the early 1980s, in the context 
of the evolution of the Law & Society movement. It also describes the changes produced in the digital age by the 
emergence of the Web of Data, Big Data, and the Internet of Things. The convergence between Law & Society and 
Artificial Intelligence & Law is also discussed. Finally, we introduce briefly the articles included in this issue.  
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1. LAW IN CONTEXT (LIC) IN CONTEXT
Volume 36 (1) of Law in Context constitutes a renewed 
Law in Context - A Socio-legal Journal. From 2019 onwards 
it will be published in Open Access at no cost to either the 
authors or the readers.  It thus represents a new stage in 
the Journal’s long and fruitful history. 
The Journal was launched in 1983 at the then Depart-
ment of Legal Studies of La Trobe University by Oliver 
Mendelsohn (as General Editor), Martin Chanock (as Book 
Editor) and Ian Patterson (as Business Manager). Although 
Law in Context (LiC) was launched after the retirement in 
1982 of E.K. Braybrooke, the charismatic founder of the 
Department, it retained his realistic stamp. It is worth 
noting that many members of the so-called “First Legal 
Scholarly Community” in Australia, after World War II, 
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were closer to American legal realists than to English 
jurisprudence (Bartie 2010).1 
Since then, LiC has been continuously published due 
to the efforts and work of many people—Christopher 
Arup, Paula Baron, Roger Douglas, Pat O´Malley, Margaret 
Thornton, to mention just a few.  Law & Society world 
leading scholars from USA, Europe and Asia (India)—such 
as Richard L. Abel, Upendra Baxi, Stanley Cohen (†), Marc 
Galanter, Doreen McBarnet, Simon Roberts (†), and Harry 
N. Scheiber—served on the Editorial Board and have sup-
ported the journal since its inception.
Looking at it from a distance, the coherence of LiC’s 
trajectory is clear. Its first editorial, written by Oliver 
Mendelsohn, reads:  
Law in Context is published as a forum for the inter-disci-
plinary study of law. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries there was a tendency to reduce the study of law to 
a narrow technical and doctrinal focus. This coincided with 
a period when it was only lawyers who were interested in 
studying law. Now, there is a widespread realisation that law 
is too important to be left to the lawyers. And the companion 
view is that legal matters can be more richly understood by 
placing them in their social context and subjecting them to 
study from a range of academic disciplines. This first issue of 
Law in Context exemplifies the inter-disciplinary approach 
to law. (LiC, Editorial 1983)
Thirty-six year later, all issues of LiC so far continue 
to show this inter-disciplinary, pluralistic, and espe-
cially contextual approach along a variety of disciplines, 
methodologies and trends. These are in the main Social 
Sciences, Humanities and Law. Yet it shows something 
else, more intangible and definitively essential: the will 
to transcend academic boundaries, i.e. a continuing and 
firm commitment to not only understand and explain but 
also participate and eventually remould the deep changes 
that were occurring after the Cold War and were affect-
ing dramatically the whole society and lives of people in 
Australia and beyond. 
We can track this approach in practically all contribu-
tions and, especially, in the collective actions that were 
generated around the Journal and  contributed to shape 
its differential style and added values—e.g. the creation 
of legal clinics; the building of feminist discourses; the 
critical approach to the rule of law; the effort to (re)write 
legal and institutional history; the defence of democracy 
and citizenship; the description and criticism of corporate 
practices and economic organisations; the emergence of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR); the close attention 
to increasing numbers of immigration flows; the study of 
Asia and individual countries therein; and the support for 
the cultural, political and judicial fights seeking for the 
recognition of Aboriginal rights, against the race-based 
policies that sustained segregation in the immediate 
colonial  past. 
In 1988, the Australian Publisher Federation Press 
commenced publishing Law in Context. Then, in 1995, the 
former Legal Studies Department at La Trobe University 
became La Trobe School of Law and Legal Studies (and 
still later, School of Law). Nevertheless, LiC maintained 
its original character and orientation. In 2013, the Journal 
celebrated its thirtieth anniversary—twenty-five years at 
Federation Press—with a Special Issue on socio-legality, 
its history, and achievements as an academic discipline 
(Petersen 2013).2 
LiC fostered both innovation and experimentation 
at a theoretical level. This specific commitment was 
not exempt from internal dissents. Embracing an open 
perspective of the law and regulations as socio-political 
patterns is more challenging than the more classical, tex-
tual, normative approach. Thus, LiC’s context of discovery 
reflects the same tensions between the formal (technical) 
and the substantive (social) approach to law that had 
characterised legal scholarship in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries —either in the Civil or the Common 
Law tradition. Perhaps more importantly, it also mirrored 
the inner disparities and confrontations of invention and 
1 This was the case of E. Kingston Braybrooke (1915-1989), who had studied at Columbia Law School in 1949. Columbia was one of the main centres of legal realism, 
under Karl Llewellyn’s leadership. Braybrooke, like Julius Stone (1907-1985) at Harvard, was also influenced by Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence. See Ker-
ruish (1989), Douglas (1989), Kirby (2012), Neil (2013). 
2 This LiC Special Issue, entitled Socio-legality: An Odyssey of Ideas and Context, was edited by Kerry Petersen and introduced by Roger Douglas. It contains essays by 
some of the leading scholars of the Journal: Christopher Arup, Paula Baron, Susanne Davies, Ian Duncanson, Ian Freckleton, David Neal, and Christopher Tomlins. As 
acknowledged by Douglas (2013, p. x), “heterogeneity (and, possibly, achievements) came at the cost of conflict.” 
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discovery that occur when epistemic, moral and political 
assumptions are at stake. 
This is not a singular feature. Thinking about govern-
ment, law and the state in the second half of the 20th cen-
tury led to discussions and eventually differences among 
scholars in all Law & Society disciplines. For instance, 
after the emergence of legal pluralism in the 1970s and 
1980s, and the hatching of globalisation in the 1990s, at 
the dawn of the new Millennium, Sally Falk Moore sum-
marised the changes in legal anthropology as follows: 
What legal domains have anthropologists examined in 
the fifty years we are considering [1949-1999]? How much 
have their topics changed? How much do the changes in topic 
reflect the shifting political background of the period? The 
big picture is simple enough. What was once a sub-field of 
anthropology largely concerned with law in non-Western 
society has evolved to encompass a much larger legal geog-
raphy. Not only does legal anthropology now study industrial 
countries, but it has expanded from the local to national and 
transnational legal matters. Its scope includes international 
treaties, the legal underpinnings of transnational commerce, 
the field of human rights, diasporas and migrants, refugees 
and prisoners, and other situations not easily captured in 
the earlier community-grounded conception of anthropology, 
though the rich tradition of local studies continues along a 
separate and parallel track. (Falk Moore 2001, p. 95) 
Thus, anthropologists “are not just talking about what 
is going on. They also are talking about what could go on 
[...] They are treating their own critical commentary as 
a form of social action [emphasis added]” (Falk Moore 
2001, p. 111). 
This “form of social action” entails a moral and eventu-
ally a political judgement, and it conforms a methodol-
ogy and a notion of law encompassing what Nonet and 
Selznick (1978) had termed, in accordance with human 
rights and social challenges, responsive law. Responsive 
law contrasts with two other notions—repressive and 
autonomous law—which do not require a similar amount 
of competence, i.e. knowledge of the social context, the 
design of better institutions, and the involvement of 
citizens in power.3  
The second wave of legal realism—the “new legal 
realism”— that has blossomed in the first decade of the 
present century has also embraced this organisational 
and institutional turn. It can be primarily defined as “an 
effort to understand the sources of judicial decisions on 
the basis of testable hypotheses and large data sets” (Miles 
and Sunstein 2008, p. 831). But, in fact, it goes beyond 
the judiciary and advanced statistical analysis. It entails 
an extended notion of context, in which principles, ethics 
and universal values acquire a new place in the dynamics 
of evolving institutions.4  “We do want to judge contexts, 
which we do by appealing to transcendent values” (Sel-
znick 2003, p. 186).5  And, as stated by the scholars who 
started the discussion, it entails the need to face new 
comprehensive relationships among the stakeholders 
themselves:
Our goal is to create translations of social science that 
will be useful even to legal academics and lawyers who do 
not wish to perform empirical research themselves, while 
also encouraging translations of legal issues that will help 
social scientists gain a more sophisticated understanding of 
how law is understood “from the inside” by those with legal 
training. (Erlanger et al.  2005, p. 336)
The pages of Law in Context also reflect this recent 
regulatory turn, related to new forms of corporate gov-
ernance, public Health, the relations between law and 
science, and the relations between quantitative and 
qualitative methods.6  
3 According to Nonet and Selznick (1978, p. 78), competence is “the most difficult problem of responsive law: In an environment of pressure the continuing authority of 
legal purpose and the integrity of the legal order depend on the design of more competent legal institutions.” 
4 As put by Nourse and Schaffer (2009, p. 134) “New legal realists refuse to believe that all law and politics should be determined by a single, consequentialist goal, but 
they also refuse to indulge the fantasy of ethical relativity.” 
5 See on the Deweyan Selznick´s naturalism, Lieberman (2012). 
6 Hence, to give only one example, Christopher Arup’s works elaborated on the multiple possible approaches to better understand innovation, intellectual property, 
labour, financial and industrial policy, and the implementation and defence of consumer rights in the blurring of private/public global space (Arup 2000). Arup correctly 
observed that to understand the role of lawyers, law firms and corporations in the process of globalisation, Law and Society scholars had to collect data by means of 
ethnographic and qualitative methods (e.g. interviews), addressing and sorting out the problem of access to the information. See, for example, Garth and Dézalay (1996, 
2002). 
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2. CONTEXT AND LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE
A new path beckons. It adds a complexity to what LiC 
already does yet also provides the opportunity of new 
fields and discourses.  This path is one that the renewed 
LiC will also now illuminate.
To tread the path for a little distance, we are in a new 
stage of the same evolution that has led capitalism to its 
next phase: the digital age. Perhaps we are not able at this 
time to entirely cope with it, as we cannot anticipate all 
the consequences that will follow from a technological 
revolution based on information-processing knowledge, 
big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and the so-called 
Internet of Things. These changes are deep, and they have 
come to stay. Even the scientific method is subject to its 
impact, due to “the presence of nonlinearity, non-locality 
and hyper-dimensions which one encounters frequently 
in multi-scale modelling of complex systems” (Succi and 
Coveney 2019). 
From a foundational point of view, the representa-
tion of knowledge is at the heart of the social shape of a 
digital society that we do not yet know.7  Our theoretical 
assumptions should acknowledge the fact that we behave 
necessarily not only with limited information but with 
limited knowledge and tools to handle this information. 
In an increasingly complex society, law consists of a set 
of regulatory components that do not constitute separate 
silos, and there is a plurality of ways to conceive their 
interrelationship.8    
From a practical point of view, everything remains 
open to the building of institutions that could be able to 
link machine and human interfaces. In a hybrid, semi-
automated world, the classical societal micro-macro 
link goes through the meso-level, in which platforms, 
apps, blockchains, and digital data are technological 
components of emergent participatory, civic, democratic, 
ecosystems (Poblet, Casanovas and Rodríguez-Doncel 
2019). However, this intermediate inter-communication 
level between machines and humans is also the yet-to-be-
fully-regulated domain in which data collection, storage, 
aggregation, and eventually analysis occur. The problem is 
who carries out the analyses, how and for what purposes 
are they performed, and what impacts they may have on 
individuals and society. 
The role of Cambridge Analytica in the British ref-
erendum to leave the European Union and in the last 
presidential elections in the US has opened a Pandora’s 
box. Democracy is certainly at stake (Cadwallader 2018, 
2019). But this is just one example among many others 
in which mass surveillance programs, financial excesses, 
uncontrolled data exchange between state agencies, ma-
nipulation of feelings, prosecution of whistle-blowers, and 
the convergence between bio-tech and info-tech may led 
to “digital dictatorships”, even under democratic political 
forms (O´Neil 2016, Harari 2018, Eveleth 2019). 
These issues have only been partially addressed so 
far. In Europe, for example, the promulgation and entry 
into force (25/05/2019) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (DGPR, 2016) enhances a broad range of pri-
vacy rights to protect citizens’ identities, personal lives 
and individual autonomy. Likewise, several Reports of 
the UN Special Rapporteur for Privacy urge the Member 
States to implement similar safeguards to avoid more data 
breaches and the evasion and denial of responsibilities 
by corporations and governments.9 
However, is this enough? Do we have the right instru-
ments in place to pursue such a noble dream?  We are 
afraid that in a hyperreal world in which reality can be 
inflated artificially with fake news but true feelings, law 
and legal measures can be inflated as well. This would 
entail a loss of meaning. It may well be that the law in 
7 “One normally thinks that everything that is true is true for a reason. I’ve found mathematical truths that are true for no reason at all. These mathematical truths 
are beyond the power of mathematical reasoning because they are accidental and random.” (Chaitin 1994) As Chaitin’s theorems have shown, information-theoretic 
computational theory deals (again) with incompleteness. Hence, it is at the limits of mathematics and reason. If some things are true for no reason at all, accidentally, at 
random, we may expect new black swans in all dimensions of societal levels (Taleb 2007).
8 Since 2010, the LNAI Workshop Series AI Approaches to the Complexity of Legal Systems shows this plurality of languages and methods for legal and social design. 
See Pagallo et al. (2018). 
9 See, Reports A/73/45712 and A/HRC/40/6, UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy (2018, 2019). There is a direct warning in the second Report: “6. [...] while most Mem-
ber States unequivocally commit themselves to protecting the right to privacy, many are acting in ways that increasingly put it at risk, by employing new technologies 
that are incompatible with the right to privacy, such as, in certain modalities, Big Data and health data, infringing upon the dignity of its citizens based on gender or 
gender identity and expression, as well as by arbitrarily surveying their own citizens.” 
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hyperreal regimes no longer requires legitimacy—the 
acquiescence of citizens—but obeying in advance.10 
Shadbolt and Hampson (2018) have pointed out that the 
regulation of digital societies is an urgent need and, yet, a 
formidable task.11 It cannot be limited just to privacy and 
security issues —these could be deemed starting points. 
As underlined by Mathews (2017) what is required now to 
match civilization requirements is a holistic view bridging 
systemic and semantic interoperability. All dimensions 
covered by statutes, regulations, policies, best practices 
and protocols should be faced through this lens. It is an 
ethical stance.  
Law & Society has produced cutting-edge research so 
far in a variety of significant subjects —gender, access 
to justice, crimes, colonialism, litigation, legal cultures, 
human rights, the rule of law, dispute resolution, among 
many others. It might be time to incorporate Computer 
Science and Artificial Intelligence languages to an epis-
temic approach for fleshing out such a rich legacy. Thus, 
the bulk of socio-legal knowledge could be taken further, 
beyond the conditions in which it was produced, and 
information technologies could also be incorporated as 
well into its array of methodologies to shed light on this 
matter. It would represent a third wave of legal realism. 
It is certainly not the only way of handling global-scale 
changes. Environmentalists may refer and lean on top of 
the “deep ecology” movement launched by Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess—back in the 1970’s. Global climate 
change has led earth scientists to propose a new division 
of the geological time as a paradigm to understand the 
impact of human behaviour on nature—the Anthropocene, 
which holds also as a political paradigm to ground policies 
and regulations (Lewis and Maslin 2015). The human body 
can be approached as well as a new analytical space deal-
ing with bio-ethics, self-reflection and health care—e.g. 
the “quantified self” of individuals tracking information 
about their own bodies (Swan 2013, Mittelstadt and Floridi 
2016). But, still, all these topics—including those related 
to Physics and Mathematics—are unthinkable without 
referring to computer science, robotics and AI running 
within this interplay between humans and machines that 
we have termed above the meso-level. 
 We believe that this mutual approach is felt as a necessity 
by both Law & Society and AI & Law communities. Artificial 
Intelligence and Law has been working for thirty years 
now in the modelling of legal norms and legal systems. As 
L. Thorne McCarty, one of the founding members, recalls 
in a recent account, it is a common mistake to believe 
that they were reducing law to rules to be modelled. On 
the contrary, the flexibility and many ways of creating 
law—including judicial tests and the “open texture” of 
its language—were considered as true challenges since 
the beginning. First wave AI systems were “very good 
at complex reasoning, but not very good at perception 
and learning” (McCarty 2019, p. 57). The second and 
third waves are. Focusing on machine learning, Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) and Knowledge Representa-
tion Technology (semantics) systems are able to better 
define the problems, to figure out different scenarios in 
non-identical environments, and to anticipate solutions. 
We can find many parallels with the evolution of Law and 
Society and its increasing attention to the transformation 
of contexts. We recommend interested scholars to read 
this account in conjunction with Kevin Ashley’s contribu-
tion about machine learning (in this issue).  
3. ABOUT THIS EDITION: LAW IN CONTEXT FOR 
THE DIGITAL AGE
There are many examples of the common ground of 
Law & Society and AI & Law. Knowledge acquisition tech-
niques, the construction of socio-technological systems 
and socio-cognitive systems, the building of cognitive 
10 This is the first lesson from the 20th century drawn by Timothy Snyder to preserve democracy. “Do not obey in advance. Most of the power of the authoritarianism is 
freely given.” (Snyder 2017, p. 16)
11 “Broadly though, a vast range of applications have been engineered on smart devices that seem capable of unlimited marvellous things: translate from one language to 
another, place a gamer in a virtually real landscape, find the best route through this afternoon’s traffic, chat about the weather with granny. There is little or no social pol-
icy framework yet around how these applications may be affecting our lives or our brains. There is not enough general understanding of the issues to begin to construct 
such a framework. Like Prospero’s sorcery in The Tempest, these magical transformations have just crept us on the waters, and we have accepted them, without as yet 
sufficient policy response. We urgently need such a framework.” (Shadbolt and Hampson 2018, p. 51) Moreover, coming to the point: “To put it ever more bluntly, the 
problem is not that machines might wrest control of our lives from the elites. The problem is that most of us might never be able to wrest control of the machines from 
the people who occupy the command posts [Emphasis added].” (Shadbolt and Hampson 2018, p. 63)
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and computational ontologies, the setting of legal and 
regulatory systems and eco-systems, the structuring and 
managing of legal data and metadata, all these processes 
require a closer attention to the work that Law and Society 
scholars have been carrying out so far.12  
Related to the LiC relaunch, we thought that pointing 
at the concept of legal knowledge as a research object 
would be a good point of departure to start thinking alike.
We asked several scholars from both fields to freely 
summarise their own work, their motivations, and personal 
journeys. We suggested some questions to be answered—
How did you approach law and legal knowledge? Why? 
What did you learn? What do you think was left in the end? 
Some wrote about their research journey; some re-
sponded with a thorough description of their recent works; 
others wrote specific essays of related topics according 
to their expertise. The result is for the reader to evaluate. 
We found it interesting, informative, and insightful. We 
organised it in such a way that some articles are placed in 
a strategic pivotal position, in the middle of the volume, 
linking both sides of the equation —socio-legal studies 
and computer science—through empirical and cultural 
social sciences and the law. We will describe the contents 
of the volume from the inside out, and from the centre to 
the two ends of the rope. 
Susanne Davies reflects on the symbolic figure of At-
ticus Finch, the main character of Harper Lee’s 1960 novel 
To Kill a Mockingbird.  This was one of the legal icons of 
the 20th century for legal and political education, against 
intolerance, racism and injustice. What happened next 
so that this figure and its meaning darkened in the 21st 
century? What about his message now? These questions 
are properly sociological and do not have a simple answer. 
Leaning on their recent books, Capital Failure and 
Australian Superannuation, Sue Jaffer and Nicholas Morris 
address the issue of the underlying causes of the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) and the various related scandals 
that have emerged in UK and Australia. Why did UK fi-
nancial regulation fail so blatantly to prevent the crisis 
and its devastating effects? And why is bad behaviour 
so endemic in the sector? The article also examines how 
the Australian banking environment has evolved and the 
inception and development of Fintech and Regtech. The 
need for new regulatory models from an ethical stance, 
able to be both more effective and trustworthy, lies at the 
core of this approach.
Both articles point at the deep social and economic 
changes that have been occurring in the early 21st century. 
The three contributions that open the volume shed 
light to the legacy, methods and trends of Law and So-
ciety studies, and how scholars were (and are) able to 
raise critical questions with a political and moral value, 
and with a global scope. Hence, they are also personal, 
disclosing some of the motivations that trigger research 
projects, and beyond that, research lives.  
On legacy. Lawrence Friedman reflects about two im-
portant topics in the present Law and Society movement: 
the sources of law, on the one hand, and the impact of 
law, on the other. He suggests the use of legal historical 
studies as a kind of control group, as studies of modern 
legal systems show a high degree of convergence. He 
delves into his own experience to describe the growth 
and extension of socio-legal studies across different legal 
cultures in the world, and the benefits that follow from 
this interconnection. 
On conscience. Martin Chanock draws a political and 
intellectual cartography of his journey through South Af-
rican history and the construction of a democratic state. 
He recalls his education and political struggles in South 
Africa, and how he started asking the right questions and 
getting the right answers about the functions of law, the 
implementation of the rule of law, and the institutional 
creation of customary law in colonial and neo-colonial 
regimes. This paper contains a sound reflection about 
truth, politics and the development of legal instruments―
a critical view on “the innocence of legalism” and the 
incapacity of the state. 
On resilience. Richard Abel’s work exemplifies citizens’ 
response to the US turn towards democratic authoritarian-
ism. He explores which strategies had been most effective 
to protect the rule of law against the “war on terror” that 
followed September 11, threatening American liberties 
12 There are many computer scientists working in this interesection—Pablo Noriega, Tom van Engers, Jeremy Pitt, Frank and Virginia Dignum, among many others. For 
a general overview on normative-multiagent systems, see Andriguetto et al. (2013); for the state of the art in law and the semantic web, Casanovas et al. (2016).
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under Bush and Obama administrations. He summarises 
the findings of his two recent books—Law’s Wars and 
Law’s Trials—concluding that the rule of law “whose 
raison d’être is to immunize law from political distortion, 
itself depends on politics.” 
Finally, this volume collects several papers that refer 
to the uses, developments and methods of technology in 
the legal domain. These papers bring us back to reality 
that impacts on our personal and professional lives.
Zhiqiong June Wang’s contribution focuses on legal 
education and technology. She brings into consideration 
three main issues: the adoption and adaptation of tech-
nologies to teaching and learning, the study and research 
of their impacts on society to formulate legal responses, 
and the preparation of future lawyers. She concludes by 
stressing the human side and its critical role in the evo-
lution of legal education: law demands a “human touch”, 
and that calls for human values and empathy. 
From a computer science perspective, John Zeleznikow 
offers an accurate and deep insight of what such a “human 
touch” means. His work has been centred on empowering 
citizens through the development of Online Dispute Reso-
lution (ODR) systems providing tools for self-represented 
litigants. His contribution to the present volume recalls 
how he became increasingly aware of the importance of 
modelling legal realism. From the early use of machine 
learning to more complex solutions, he realised that law 
was more than a mere application of rules: “Law is used 
as a social device to reflect society’s changing attitudes.”
We situated Kevin Ashley´s article at the end of this 
volume, last but not least. It consists of an illuminating 
account of the evolution of Machine Learning (ML) tech-
niques across the AI and Law field. Understanding the 
rationale of judicial sentencing and being able to predict 
the outcomes have always been one of the aims of legal 
realism. So has it been for computer scientists as well. Fo-
cusing on recent developments in legal text analytics and 
the techniques to extract meanings from legal decisions, 
contracts and statutes, this article explains in detail how 
bottom-up approaches enrich and complement top-down 
ones. What is actually possible, why, and what is next. 
4. LAW IN CONTEXT IN OPEN ACCESS
From Issue 36 (1) onwards Law in Context (LiC) will be 
published in an Open Access format. It complies with the 
sixteen Principles of Transparency and Best Practice 
in Scholarly Publishing published by the Committee 
on Publication Ethics, the Directory of Open Access 
Journals, the Open Access Scholarly Publishers Associa-
tion, and the World Association of Medical Editors.13   It 
also follows the ten core practices of the Committee on 
Publication Ethics, and the policies of the Australasian 
Open Access Strategy Group chart.14 
According to its tradition, Law in Context is keen to 
publish original and pathbreaking contributions in the 
fields of legal studies, legal scholarship and jurisprudence. 
We will of course be happy to host Technology/AI & Law 
approaches to these fields, so that we can see where this 
new path may lead us.  
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